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This article assesses the role of “constructive ambiguity” in promoting European integration.1 
Henry Kissinger famously defined constructive ambiguity as “the deliberate use of ambiguous 
language in a sensitive issue in order to advance some political purpose” (Berridge and James 
2003). In an early formulation of the argument we explore in this article, Stanley Hoffmann 
(1995[1966]: 131) wrote: “There has always been most progress when the Europeans were 
able to preserve a penumbra of ambiguity around their enterprise, so as to keep each one 
hoping that the final shape would be closest to his own ideal, and to permit broad coalitions to 
support the next moves.” Constructive ambiguity has become a received wisdom among 
Europeanists, a bit like Henry Kissinger’s phone number, Jacques Delors’s unidentified 
political object, Donald Puchala’s elephant, or the bicycle that cannot stop. Yet it has not been 
subject to systematic empirical scrutiny.2  
While the role of ambiguity remains understudied in EU politics, it is enjoying some currency 
in related fields such as anthropology, public policy, and international relations. For Murray 
Edelman (2001: 80), “[a]mbiguity (…) is especially conspicuous in political language because 
by definition politics concerns conflicts of interests.” Indeed, ambiguity is often seen as a 
means to conceal or to postpone conflict. Using the example of the “social responsibility” 
label in the mutual fund industry, Linda Markowitz and her colleagues (2012) argue that 
strategic actors frame financial products ambiguously to reduce negative reactions in the 
market. Looking at “agencification” in public administrations, Daniel Moynihan (2006) 
documents how ambiguity allows policy-makers to overlook negative experiences when they 
                                                
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the Eighteenth International Conference of the 
Council of European Studies, Barcelona, June 20-22, 2011. We thank Esther Barbé, Nora El Qadim, 
BC Lu, Grégoire Mallard, Frédéric Varone, Antoine Rayroux, and two anonymous WEP reviewers for 
their comments and suggestions. This research was funded by the Social Science and Humanities 
Research Council. 
2 Neil Fligstein (1997), referring to the role of the Delors Commission in producing the Single Market 
Program, talks of “framing” ambiguity. Speaking of the same program, Nicolas Jabko (2006: 6) also 
refers to a “fundamental ambiguity” that was “the necessary glue for putting together a winning 
coalition in favor of European reforms.” While these arguments are congruent with ours, they do not 
specifically test whether and how ambiguity is constructive. 
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adopt superficially similar policy concepts. Bruno Palier (2005) has also shown how 
ambiguity works in his analysis of successive social policy reforms in France, which, he 
argues, were based on an “ambiguous consensus” around which policy actors attached 
different meanings. Finally, a number of critical scholars linked to the linguistic turn in 
International Relations have studied the performative power of “being understood in two or 
more ways,” for example in global (financial) governance, where ambiguity seems better 
adapted to actors’ practices than transparency (Best 2011).  
Some authors view ambiguity in terms of “incomplete contracting,” whereby the ambiguity of 
formal treaty provisions encourages policy actors to negotiate the creation of informal rules, 
which may or may not in turn become formal rules (Farrell and Héritier 2005; Mallard 2009). 
We operationalize ambiguity differently, namely as a strategy used by political entrepreneurs 
to communicate with their audiences to push for a policy initiative. The intuitive advantage of 
ambiguity in communicating policy proposals is that it does not offend those who hold the 
power to support or block a proposal, what we refer to as the “audience.” Its main drawback 
is that it may fail to mobilize anyone, or backfire when clarifications are requested. 
Ambiguity is thus a “double-edged sword” (Mallard 2009).  
Focusing on the institutionalization of the EU, our paper looks at (1) the conditions under 
which ambiguity is likely to be used by strategic actors to push for a policy proposal; (2) the 
conditions under which ambiguity is likely to be constructive. Regarding the first question, 
we argue that political entrepreneurs face two options when trying to mobilize a coalition of 
actors behind a policy proposal: they can either clarify its intended outcome in order to 
galvanize support (strategy of clarity), or they can use a label to which different meanings will 
be attached in order to minimize opposition (strategy of ambiguity). Ambiguity thus appears 
strategic in circumstances where clarity would face strong opposition. In the context of the 
EU, it is expected to be an attractive strategy when member state preferences are 
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heterogeneous and the EU’s legal basis is weak. Political entrepreneurs can then bring 
together powerful actors behind what Jabko (2006: 5) calls a “strategic repertoire of ideas,” 
some elements of which the audience does not substantively agree on. This carries some risks, 
however, for such coalitions tend to be fragile, a crucial factor explaining why, even though 
ambiguity is pervasive is social life, political entrepreneurs rarely design it as a conscious 
strategy. 
Regarding the second question, we argue that ambiguous ideas are likely to be effective only 
if they are embedded in what we call an institutional opportunity structure, that is, a formal-
legal context that entrepreneurs can fold into their strategic repertoire of ideas. For the 
purposes of this article, what makes a strategy constructive is that it strengthens European 
integration. While we agree with Jabko (2006) that a “political strategy” based on ideas can 
spur the mobilization of a coalition of powerful actors, we contend that neither the content of 
ideas nor the social skills of political entrepreneurs are sufficient for a strategy of ambiguity 
to have long-lasting political effects. A strategy of ambiguity will probably not entrench a 
European policy if it does not rest, like Delors’ Single Market Program did, on an institutional 
basis. This suggests that political entrepreneurs should be wary of relying on coalition 
building by ambiguity only. 
Research design 
Based on a focused, longitudinal comparison, our paper provides a test of the constructive 
ambiguity argument by comparing two policy domains: energy and defense. The former 
illustrates a partial success for constructive ambiguity, as the EU’s efforts were turned into 
new treaty articles and substantive policy implementation; the latter, in contrasts, represents 
an instance of failure, as the EU still provides a rather loose intergovernmental commitment 
with regard to security and defense.  
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In energy policy, the Commission has tried to expand its competences from single market 
regulation to a more transversal and comprehensive authority by linking climate change and 
security of supply within a single narrative. In defense policy, the Council Secretariat has 
been at the forefront of efforts to forge a common “strategic culture,” made up of different 
elements from national cultures, which would buttress the development of the common 
security and defense policy. Comparing these cases is instructive for several reasons. First, 
while both domains initially rested on a weak treaty basis, they have gone through periods 
when member state preferences were more or less convergent, thus allowing us to observe the 
interaction between preferences and strategic decisions. Second, both domains were launched 
twice at the EU level. Whereas the first attempt, which relied on a strategy of clarity, failed in 
the 1950s, the second, relying on a strategy of ambiguity, fared better in the late 1990s, 
suggesting that, under some circumstances, ambiguity is indeed preferable to clarity. Third, 
once launched, the initiatives had different fates, as the common energy policy made 
significantly more progress than defense, which stalled after a few years. This variation 
allows for a comparison of the factors that interact with a strategy of ambiguity to drive or 
hinder integration. Concretely, our methodology is to process trace the co-variation of 
strategies of ambiguity and “construction” in these two policy fields over time. This entails 
identifying (1) the moments when political entrepreneurs pursued a strategy of ambiguity in a 
policy field; (2) the outcome of the strategy in terms of either weak or strong 
institutionalization. As a useful comparator, we contrast these occasions with others when the 
dominant strategy was one of clarity and/or when little European integration took place. 
 
 
 
Table 1. The development of the EU’s energy and defense policies, 1950-2010 
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ENERGY 
POLICY 
I (1950s) II (1970s) III (1980s-mid-
1990s) 
IV (2000s) 
Demand 
conditions 
Energy shortages 
 Divergent 
preferences (France 
vs Germany) 
Oil crisis 
 Convergent 
preferences 
None 
Divergent 
preferences (esp. 
UK) 
Climate change 
crisis 
Gas crisis 
Divergent 
preferences (East vs 
West) 
Institutional 
opportunity 
structure 
ECSC and Euratom 
Treaties  
No treaty basis Single Market 
Program 
Competition, 
internal market, 
enlargement and 
role in climate 
change negotiations 
Dominant 
strategy 
Clarity: 
reconstruction 
Clarity: 
diversification, 
national 
independence 
Clarity:  
liberalization 
Ambiguity: 
competition, 
sustainability, 
security 
Institutional 
outcome 
None None (a few 
directives on 
reserves) 
Medium, narrow 
institutionalization 
(directives on 
liberalization) 
Expanding 
institutionalization 
(energy regulation 
agency; EU 
emissions trading 
scheme) 
 
 
DEFENSE 
POLICY 
Ia (1950s) IIa (1960-1980s) IIIa (late 1990s) IVa (2000s) 
Demand 
conditions 
Korean War 
 
Divergent 
preferences (France 
vs Germany) 
None 
 
Divergent 
preferences (esp. 
France) 
Balkans Wars 
 
Divergent 
preferences (France 
vs. UK) 
None 
 
Convergent 
preferences 
Institutional 
opportunity 
structure 
No treaty basis No treaty basis 
(Article 5 in 
NATO) 
No treaty basis European Defense 
Initiative 
Dominant strategy Clarity:  
collective defense 
Clarity:  
European autonomy  
Ambiguity:  
Europe, crisis 
management, 
defense 
Ambiguity:  
Europe, crisis 
management, 
defense 
Institutional 
outcome 
None None Weak, expanding 
institutionalization 
(political-military 
bodies in Brussels) 
Halted 
institutionalization  
(a few missions) 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the evolution of energy and defense policy discussions in the EU context. 
In our model, demand conditions and institutional opportunity structures interact with 
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strategic decisions to produce institutional outcomes. The dominant strategy describes 
whether political entrepreneurs, when they pushed for European integration, chose clarity or 
ambiguity when putting their case. Clarity and ambiguity are, of course, relative concepts. We 
define a strategy of ambiguity as one that coalesces around a “floating signifier,” as a 
repertoire of ideas that are not prima facie self-contradictory but are intended to resonate with 
multiple audiences. Jabko, for instance, explains how the Commission played on the term 
“market” to relaunch the EU in the 1980s, as it could be understood simultaneously as a norm, 
a constraint, a space, or a talisman, thus appealing to different constituencies. Such a strategy 
seeks to create diffuse acquiescence, that is, to minimize opposition to a policy proposal by 
presenting a seemingly innocuous label. A strategy of clarity, by contrast, communicates to a 
single audience an univocal meaning about the intended outcome of a policy proposal: in 
other words, it resonates with the beliefs of a pre-existing coalition of actors which it seeks to 
galvanize. The attempt to create a European Constitution with a clear finalité politique would 
fit this definition. 
Identifying demand conditions allows us to see whether or not “objective” factors are a 
necessary cause for policy development to occur. We define the presence of objective demand 
as the irruption of a crisis on the European agenda, which leads policy actors to believe that 
current institutional arrangements are untenable (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). We expect 
political entrepreneurs to favour either ambiguity or clarity depending on whether member 
state preferences concerning possible responses to the crisis are divergent or convergent. The 
institutional opportunity structure determines whether political entrepreneurs can utilize 
institutional elements (for example a treaty article) in their strategic repertoire of ideas. Such 
legal-formal elements may even be loosely connected to the policy proposal. For example, the 
Commission was able to reshape the electricity sector in the 1990s by relying on its internal 
market competence even though its energy competence was shallow.  
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In terms of outcome, we distinguish between degrees of institutionalization, encompassing 
both scope and depth. The scope of institutionalization refers to how widely the EU’s 
competence applies. We consider that institutionalization is weak if the only result of the 
actions of entrepreneurs is that institutional bodies are created and a small number of 
activities are organized with no lasting impact. We also look at discursive production: green 
and white papers, strategy documents, codes of conducts, and so on. Strong 
institutionalization happens when member states begin to feel the effects of EU policy, that is, 
when institutional development is translated into tangible and constraining policy outputs, 
such as binding directives. A European regulatory space is then firmly in place. 
A second concern relates to how one illustrates that it was indeed ambiguity that acted as the 
ideational mechanism making policy development possible. In other words, how can we 
ascertain that the interaction dynamics outlined above are not spurious? Table 1 suggests that 
demand conditions and the institutional opportunity structure only take us so far in 
understanding the setting of energy and defense policies on the EU’s agenda, thus it is 
plausible that ideas have also been a driver of institutionalization, albeit in combination with 
other variables (Parsons 2002). An additional step is to show that political entrepreneurs put 
in place a broad coalition around a set of ambiguous ideas. While the creation of a supporting 
coalition through clarity implies a focus on actors with similar perceptions and expectations, 
coalition building by ambiguity entails the need to reach out to a diverse group of “strange 
bedfellows” (Jabko 2006), who interpret the EU’s discourse differently. Operationally, this 
requires documenting which groups bought into which meaning among the menu of meanings 
encapsulated in the political entrepreneur’s discourse. To reconstruct the process of coalition 
building, we conducted interviews with officials in Brussels (Commission, Council, 
Parliament) and key member states (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Poland). In the case 
of energy policy, the main entrepreneur is the Commission and the intended audience 
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comprises economic, foreign and environment ministries as well as energy firms; for defense, 
the main entrepreneurs were, first, national diplomats and then the High Representative, while 
the audience consists of national defense ministries and staffs. 
A Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy Policy 
The EU was created and has evolved in the shadow of energy issues. At its core, the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was about organizing the power necessary for industrial 
production. When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, it included not only the Common 
Market but also the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Over the years, 
however, the energy issue drifted on and off the European agenda, while member states 
remain anxious to maintain control over energy policy issues. 
The 1950-70s: some treaty basis, a strategy of clarity, but no output 
The ECSC was created in the context of the acute energy shortages of the post-war period 
(stage I in Table 1). The joint statement issued by the 6 foreign ministers who signed the 
Treaty of Paris (1951) made no secret of what the ECSC meant: “In signing the Treaty”, they 
wrote, “the Contracting Parties have given proof of their determination to create the first 
supranational institution and thus to lay the real foundations of an organized Europe.”3 One 
could argue that the six founding members were surprised by how much they had given up 
during the negotiations. While “supranational” was a strong word in France for symbolic 
reasons, it was Germany that would have to share its resources. But as investment picked up 
across Europe in the fifties and sixties, and as the relative importance of coal declined, the 
Community never had much policy impact. Despite the strong competences bestowed by the 
Paris treaty on the High Authority, (formally, it enjoyed more autonomy and power than the 
                                                
3 Joint Declaration by the Signatory Ministers (18 April 1951). Available at 
http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/a5bee6ca-6506-48bb-9bd5-c1aa8487bdfd/en (accessed 
December 3, 2012). 
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European Commission), the ECSC remained fairly toothless. As for Euratom, founded in 
1957, it was hamstrung from the start by France’s refusal to place its nuclear production under 
supranational supervision (Mallard 2009). 
When the energy crisis hit Europe in the early 1970s, it was caused not by a shortage of 
European coal, but by a shortage of Middle Eastern oil (stage II). While European 
governments agreed on the need to do something about this, Brussels was confined to the 
sidelines. A few directives on oil reserves were adopted4 but the major political reaction, led 
by the US, consisted of the creation of the International Energy Agency in 1974 (Scott 1994). 
In this context, diversification was the main concern for EU member states, which explains 
the exploration of the North Sea by the UK or the French vigorous nuclear program– all 
national initiatives. For most of the 1980s, the EU played only a modest role in energy policy. 
This is not surprising given abundant oil and gas supplies and the development of national 
nuclear power. 
The 1990s: from clarity to a strategy of ambiguity  
The Commission reasserted itself in the 1990s, in the wake of the Single Market Program 
(stage III). Renewed action on the energy front was not a response to any perceived crisis, but 
a spinoff from the Commission’s liberalization drive. Although electricity was not even 
mentioned in the 1985 White Paper on the Internal Market, a first directive on the internal 
electricity market, based on a 1988 working paper, was adopted in 1996. It provided for 
limited third party access to electricity networks and put an end to the monopolies that had 
previously dominated the construction of power lines and power stations (Eising and Jabko 
2001). As far as electricity was concerned, market liberalization was unambiguous. It was not 
                                                
4 The Council of Ministers adopted a first directive (68/414/EEC) in 1968: Member States were asked 
to maintain a minimum stock of crude oil and/or petroleum products for 65 days of consumption. 
Growing concerns about import dependence let to an increase of this strategic reserve to 90 days in 
1972 (directive 72/425/EEC). Similar measures to secure stocks of fossil fuels followed in 1973 
(73/238/EEC) and 1975 (directive 75/339/EEC) in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. 
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presented as an energy policy per se. Throughout these years, the Commission attempted to 
break down national and regional monopolies by using its competition and internal market 
authority. As Eising and Jabko (2001: 747) point out, “the fact that Single Market agenda 
imposed itself as a generic horizon of EU policy making undoubtedly bolstered the odds for 
liberalization in the electricity sector”. Although it took some time, this resulted in real 
institutionalization, but over a narrow set of issues - essentially the breaking down of 
monopolies. Despite its initial misgivings about the Single European Act, the UK came round 
to support this liberalization strategy, which paved the way for two more energy packages, 
covering electricity and gas, to be adopted in the 2000s. The directives imposed the 
unbundling of power generation, transmission and distribution in the European market.  
The Commission’s ambition to create a full-fledged energy policy appeared later, in the 
2000s, as a security and an environmental dimension were added to the market one. The 
Commission’s discourse became more complex and more ambiguous. A series of gas 
shortages that affected the EU’s new member states and the threat of climate change 
dominated the EU’s agenda during this decade, fueling a sense of urgency (Andoura et al. 
2010). The Commission piggybacked on its growing role in enlargement and post-Kyoto 
international climate negotiations to push for concerted action vis-à-vis Eastern partners and 
climate change (stage IV). Brussels used these institutional developments as well as its more 
clearly established internal market competence to stake out a role in energy policy beyond 
liberalization. While successive gas crises involving Ukraine and Russia (in 2006 and 2009) 
were used to justify the need for a common energy policy (Crooks 2007), a climate and 
energy package was adopted in 2008 to implement the so-called 20-20-20 targets: by 2020, 
the EU has to reduce its CO2 emissions by at least 20% below the 1990 level, to increase its 
share of renewable energy to 20% of energy production, and to upgrade its efficiency to 
reduce energy consumption by 20%. 
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Under the leadership of first, Romano Prodi and then Jose Manuel Barroso, the Commission 
framed the need for a common energy policy under its guidance by linking three issues: the 
internal market for energy, climate change, and external action with regards to the security of 
supply. This strategic repertoire of ideas crystallized between 2000 and 2010, as illustrated by 
the deluge of publications with almost identical titles: the Green Paper Towards a European 
Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply (2000), the Green Paper A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy (2006), and the Green Paper Towards a Secure, 
Sustainable and Competitive European Energy Network (2008).  
Linking competition, sustainability and security, this strategy of ambiguity targeted a diverse 
group of economic and political actors. It resonated with numerous different audiences, 
ranging from large energy firms in Western Europe looking for investment opportunities and 
a stable business environment (EDF, GDF Suez, Vattenfall, E.On, RWE) to environmental 
groups seeking to promote energy efficiency (Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund), and from a 
German government trying to entrench its climate change policy in a European framework to 
insecure political leaders in the East looking for leverage vis-à-vis Russia.  
On the surface, there is a consensus on the importance of a common energy policy among 
governments, firms, and interest groups. Yet, as a German civil servant puts it, “they want the 
same thing, but for different reasons” (interview with authors, April 2011). The representative 
of a Brussels-based electricity association explains that European governance is fundamental 
and that a common energy policy, a common approach to security and a European design for 
energy markets are absolutely necessary (interview with authors, April 2011). But there is 
disagreement about what this means in practice. Some German utilities, which produce 
conventional energy and have neglected renewable energy for a long time, are less 
enthusiastic about a common energy policy, fearing the costs of CO2 emissions trading 
(interview with authors, April 2010). For its part, the Green movement sees a common energy 
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policy as a way to anchor measures to tackle climate change, such as enhanced energy 
efficiency and more ambitious targets for renewables. In this, they enjoy the support of certain 
industrial actors, such as Enercon, that are seeking to benefit from their first mover advantage 
in the renewable technology market.  
The ambiguity of the Commission’s strategic repertoire of ideas is further illustrated by the 
fact that governmental support is variable on the three issues. While countries like France, the 
UK and especially Germany push the climate agenda, Eastern member states and, in 
particular, Poland, highlight security. A Polish energy expert sums up the selective use of 
ambiguity as follows:  
So, the Commission claims that there should be a balance between these three issues, 
but actually the problem is that, from the national perspective, each member states 
builds a hierarchy, using these three. If you look at Polish issues, then you can 
definitely put the supply issue at the top: it is the priority – how to make us less 
vulnerable to any potential problems with the supply from the East. Then, recently, the 
climate issue emerged not as an opportunity but as a challenge because of our coal 
dependence. Lastly, it’s the market issue, which is still, I think, on the bottom of the 
Polish debate over energy policy, although for the Commission it is actually one of the 
corner stones (…) we Poles, generally speaking, are afraid of these invisible market 
instruments that are to govern our security (interview with authors, April 2010). 
For their part, German and French civil servants and energy experts affirm that their countries 
do not need the EU to ensure energy security. A German official insists, for example, that it is 
the role neither of the state nor of the EU to negotiate with Russia on behalf of private 
utilities. For his French counterpart, the Quai d’Orsay is well connected and does not require 
the EU’s help (interviews, April 2010, May 2011). Neither the Germans nor the French 
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openly oppose an external relations dimension to the EU’s energy policy, but nor do they 
strongly favour it.   
Institutionalization in the 2000s 
To what extent has the Commission’s strategy of ambiguity been translated into the creation 
of a European regulatory space overseeing competition, sustainability, external relations? In 
2009, the Lisbon Treaty introduced energy as a shared competence, whereby member states 
cannot exercise authority when the Union has done so. Article 194 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union reads as follows:  
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with 
regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy 
shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between member states, to: a) ensure the functioning 
of the energy market; b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; c) promote 
energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms 
of energy; and d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. (…)  
While nominal support for the notion of a common energy policy has been broad, the 
Commission faced and continues to face, different institutional opportunity structures with 
regards to the three policy domains. We find that more progress was made when the 
Commission was able to seize institutional opportunities to push its strategy of ambiguity, 
such as when it relied on its exclusive or shared competences over competition or the internal 
market to regulate electricity and gas production and distribution, or when it piggybacked on 
its growing role in climate negotiations to regulate energy consumption. But when it comes to 
external relations, the Commission has few institutional elements to embed in its strategic 
repertoire of ideas. While the demand conditions for a single policy in this area are strong, the 
Commission’s strategy has not convinced member states to alter their positions.  
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With regard to the market dimension, institutionalization has shifted from informal policy 
networks to the creation of an independent, central European body. As Thatcher and Coen 
(2008: 8) note for other European regulatory spaces, “there has been a thickening of 
organizations and rules concerning regulation.” To push the liberalization process, the 
Commission, first, established informal structures to bring together state and non-state actors, 
notably the Florence Forum for electricity and the Madrid Forum for gas. Subsequently, it 
moved to more formal venues by creating the Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER), followed by the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG). 
Finally, the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), was created 
under the third energy package in 2009 and has been operational since March 2011. ACER 
coordinates the activities of national regulators, contributes to the establishment of European 
network rules, and makes binding decisions concerning access and operational security for 
cross border infrastructures (Jegen 2011).  
Climate change has also seen some degree of institutionalization, notably with the creation of 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (2003 directive amended in 2004, 2008 and 2009). The 
EU ETS is based on a legally binding “cap and trade” system, under which firms receive 
emission allowances to trade on the market. Because it is based on directives, this scheme 
allows the Commission to refer member states to the European Court of Justice if they do not 
fulfill their obligations. During the first (2005-2007) and second (2008-2012) phases of the 
EU ETS, member states allocated allowances to their national companies; in the third phase, 
beginning in 2013, allowances will be auctioned at the EU level. At the moment, the EU ETS 
covers emissions from electric utilities, combustion plants, oil refineries, iron and steel works, 
and different energy intensive factories (cement, pulp and paper, etc.). The intention is to 
extend it to airlines and other industries (such as aluminum and petrochemicals).5 Another 
                                                
5 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (accessed June 9, 2011) 
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step towards institutionalization was the creation of the Directorate-General for Climate 
Action in 2010, and the transfer of the climate dossier from the DG Environment. Among the 
mandates of new the DG CLIMA are international negotiations on climate change, issues of 
climate adaptation, the implementation of the EU ETS as well as the monitoring of the EU’s 
2020 targets. 
Although it received a great deal of media attention, much less institutionalization has 
occurred with regard to energy external relations. The EU has launched various initiatives 
with an energy component, for example in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy 
or with OPEC. Despite the creation of a Network of Energy Security Correspondents 
(NESCO) in 2007, most of these initiatives were ad hoc and toothless (Youngs 2009). 
Although the European External Action Service (EEAS) has been active since 2010 and 
features energy among its global challenge policies,6 it is difficult to detect energy security-
related activities that have a structuring effect on member states. Profound differences 
between them in terms of energy mix, suppliers, and external political allies mean that the 
interests of member states remain heterogeneous, limiting the potential for a single EU voice. 
Summary 
With the exception of electricity liberalization - originally framed not as an energy policy but 
a competition issue - the major durable European energy policy initiatives were cast in a 
“penumbra of ambiguity.” The ECSC and Euratom designs were unambiguous in that they 
entailed the supranationalization of coal, steel and nuclear power. By and large, they were 
failures, as member governments refused to play ball as soon as they understood what was at 
stake. The creation of an internal electricity market in the late 1990s was much more 
successful, even in the absence of strong demand, because it formed part of a larger 
liberalization drive that galvanized important actors. In contrast to these experiences, the 
                                                
6 http://eeas.europa.eu/energy/index_en.htm (accessed June 9, 2011) 
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Commission’s current strategy relies on ambiguity, as it links energy with the environment, 
liberalization, and external relations. This was necessary to placate audiences as diverse as 
public utilities, conservative politicians, and Green activists. But as we have seen, its 
implementation succeeded only where the Commission was able to exploit institutional 
opportunities such as treaty competences or its formal role in international negotiations. And 
while there is now a regulatory framework in place, member states maintain control over core 
energy issues such as energy mix, energy taxation, and especially suppliers.  
European Defence, Peace, and Crisis Management  
The project of a European defense policy is as old as the EU – in fact much older, since 
blueprints for a European army can be found as far back as the 16th Century. Different 
initiatives were put forward during the Cold War and post-Cold War period, notably the 
European Defense Community (EDC), the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), 
and the Western European Union (WEU). Some were pushed through a strategy of clarity and 
others through a strategy of ambiguity, but all of them were more or less stillborn, due to 
either persistent divergences among European states themselves, or the presence of a US-
backed alternative - NATO. Launched in 1998, the Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP) initially fared a little better, but has not led to substantial institutionalization.  
The 1950s-1980s: Clarity in the EDC and NATO 
The first serious defense integration project emerged in 1950, when France, under Prime 
Minister René Pleven, proposed the creation of the EDC (stage Ia in Table 1). Like the ECSC, 
the “Pleven Plan” was the brainchild of Jean Monnet. And like the ECSC, which was 
launched a few months before, it offered a solution to the problem of Germany’s 
reconstruction. Germany would be allowed to rearm, provided that its armed forces were fully 
integrated in a West European structure. A supranational commissariat would be created to 
manage a common defense budget. Europe-based armed forces would be integrated at the 
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battlegroup-level and would provide Europe’s contribution to the Atlantic Alliance. As its 
critics recognized at the time, the EDC was a highly ambitious project that flew in the face of 
national sovereignty. 
The reasons behind France’s proposal are well known. Faced with the Korean War, the US 
made it clear that Europeans would have to take care of the Eastern front. This implied a 
significant military contribution form Germany. Washington exerted strong pressure on Paris 
to accept German rearmament. As John Foster Dulles put it, Europe would face an “agonizing 
reappraisal” if it failed to comply. However, only five years after the end of World War II, the 
notion of German rearmament remained anathema to the French (Duchin 1992).  
Signed in 1952 by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, the Treaty of Paris, 
which created the EDC, was killed when the French National Assembly refused, by a small 
but cross-party majority, to ratify it (Aron and Lerner 1956). Political and military leaders had 
become increasingly critical of what they called the “European Army.” Against the 
background of the two colonial wars in which France was engaged - in Indochina and Algeria 
- the idea of committing French soldiers to an anti-Soviet supranational authority could not be 
countenanced by Gaullists, Communists, and large sections of public opinion. There was no 
room for ambiguity in what Raymond Aron (quoted in Parsons 2003:68) called “the greatest 
ideological and political debate France has known since the Dreyfus affair.”7  
                                                
7 Our interpretation may appear contradictory with Grégoire Mallard’s who, in his forthcoming book, 
argues that ambiguity (which he opposes to transparency and opacity) was the main strategy adopted 
by the negotiators of the EDC treaty. The disagreement is based on a different operationalization of 
ambiguity, and it is useful to contrast it with ours. For Mallard, the ambiguity of formal treaty 
provisions encourages policy actors to negotiate the creation of informal rules, which may or may not 
in turn become formal rules. Rather than focusing on treaty negotiations like he does, we look at how 
political entrepreneurs communicate with their audiences to push for a policy initiative. While the 
content of treaty provisions may have been ambiguous, there was, in the debates leading to the 
National Assembly vote that defeated the treaty, growing agreement on what the EDC meant, namely 
the creation of a European Army. The interpretation that thus crystallized may have been wrong, of 
course, but one would be hard pressed to imagine what could have been a clearer strategy than 
presenting the EDC “like a quasi-federation.” 
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As a result of this failure, Germany and Italy joined NATO in 1955. The WEU, which was 
supposed to become the European arm of the Alliance, remained dormant. For the next 40 
years, military cooperation developed in the NATO framework (stage IIa). For most West 
European countries, NATO had two advantages as compared to the EDC. First, through a 
strongly worded mutual defense clause (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty), it provided a US 
security guarantee; with the end of the Korean War, this became easier for US forces to 
accept. Second, NATO did not infringe upon the sovereignty of its members to the degree that 
the EDC would have, in that the military alliance did not amount to political integration. 
France was the only country that objected to NATO’s integrated military structures. Although 
France charted its own course under the tenure of Charles de Gaulle, the relative stability of 
the Cold War meant that European initiatives in the field of defense remained merely 
rhetorical. French proposals for closer Franco-German cooperation and European strategic 
autonomy were widely thought to be impractical, pointless and even dangerous since 
European cooperation could undermine European security. The “counter-strategy” of clarity 
launched by Paris relied on a grandiose discourse that did not resonate outside France.  
The 1990s: The Ambiguity of the Saint-Malo Deal 
Things changed abruptly with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Again, the field of European 
security was shattered by the threat of US withdrawal. New opportunities also arose with the 
planned accession of former Soviet satellites to the EU. When coupled with steeply declining 
defense budgets, the end of the Cold War made it necessary for European states to find new 
ways to cooperate among themselves.8 Between 1990 and 2000, several options were put on 
the table. One was to enlarge NATO and transform it into a political organization. Another 
                                                
8 Between 1987 and 1991, defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) fell 
from 4% to 2.8% in France, from 3% to 1.9% in Germany, and from 4.7% to 4.2% in the UK. While 
defense expenditures in Europe oscillated between 5% and 7% of GDP around the mid-1960s, they 
had dropped to between 1.4% and 2.3% around the turn of the twenty-first century. These budget cuts 
led to an important downsizing of European armed forces. Between 1987 and 2001, military personnel 
declined by 50% in France and 38% in Germany. In the UK, regular forces declined by one-third. 
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was to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), building 
on its large membership and tools for confidence building. A third option was to rejuvenate 
the WEU and transform it into a fully-fledged military organization (Croft 2000). 
By the end of the 1990s, it had become clear that the OSCE did not have the teeth to deal with 
hard security challenges, notably in the Balkans. The WEU was never seriously tested,, in 
large part because the security establishment did not take it seriously. The NATO option 
collapsed in 1997, when France and the US failed to strike a compromise on the distribution 
of military commands between North Americans and Europeans. 
It was in this context that a handful of diplomats designed a fourth option, namely the 
possibility of giving the EU a military role (Mérand 2010). These diplomats included a group 
of British Europeanists and French Atlanticists: Robert Cooper (UK Cabinet deputy secretary 
for defense), Richard Hatfield (political advisor in the the UK Ministry of Defense), Emyr 
Jones Parry (FCO political director), Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (French Ministry of 
Defense, director for strategic affairs) and Gérard Errera and Gérard Araud (French foreign 
ministry political directors). At the December 1998 Saint-Malo Summit, the British and the 
French agreed to give the EU an autonomous role in defense affairs, so long as this be done 
in cooperation with NATO. The Saint-Malo Declaration read as follows: “The Union must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to 
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”  
Thus CSDP was born (stage IIIa).  François Heisbourg (2000: 5) remarked at the time that: 
A certain studied imprecision about the eventual destination has … been essential to 
the progress of [C]SDP. The strategic purposes of the headline force and the 
budgetary means necessary to give substance to [C]SDP have been more or less 
shrouded in a European version of ‘constructive ambiguity.’ This is not an unusual 
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feature of the European integration process, in which progress has often depended on 
defining practical objectives first… and deferring to a later stage the consideration of 
issues of principles and implementation. 
As Stanley Hoffman (2000) pointed out, the most ambiguous term in the Saint-Malo 
Declaration is “autonomy.” For the French, it meant autonomous decision-making, that is, 
independence from NATO. For the British, it meant autonomous capabilities, that is, the 
ability to provide a serious European contribution to allied operations. Clarity on this score 
would have rendered an agreement impossible. Interviewees report that this ambiguity was 
by design: it was perfectly understood by the negotiators and used strategically to sell the 
project to their respective domestic and international audiences. After an initially skeptical 
reaction on the part of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who feared “decoupling, 
duplication, or discrimination,” Washington decided to buy into the British narrative 
(apparently after intense lobbying by the defense minister, Lord Robertson).  
Since Paris and London were considered to be worlds apart on the issue of defense 
cooperation, other EU member states quickly lent their support to this unexpected coalition. 
This included even neutral states, comforted by the fact that CSDP was labeled neither a 
military alliance nor an army but a crisis management policy. Much care was, of course, 
taken to show that the CSDP’s remit did not overlap with NATO’s turf (Hofmann 2009). In 
fact, everybody except hard core Euroskeptics could project his or her own meaning onto 
CSDP (Mérand 2006). For the French and later the Poles, CSDP was about defense in a 
dangerous world. For German and the Belgian federalists, it was all about promoting 
European integration and peace. And for the British or the Swedes, CSDP was one crisis 
management policy instrument among many others.  
Based on this “penumbra of ambiguity,” the European defense initiative was carried forward 
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(Kurowska 2009, Dyjkstra 2010). Between 2000 and 2005, CSDP made unexpected progress. 
The EU acquired political-military bodies, such as the Political and Security Committee, the 
EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and later the European Defense Agency. 
Hundreds of military officers moved to Brussels. More than 20 crisis management operations 
– 6 of them military – were launched. Considerable efforts were invested in forging a 
“common strategic culture” among decision-makers and operational planners, for example 
through the multiplication of institutional bodies in Brussels and the creation of a European 
Security and Defense College. However, as several authors have noted, the ambiguity 
remains. The EU has not been able to establish a common strategic culture, whereby 
European nations would agree on a set of principles regarding the use of force. While the 
French foreign ministry pushes for ambitious military operations in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
German defense ministry and parliamentarians are reluctant to intervene beyond the Balkans. 
The British are generally disengaged and politicians from neutral countries prefer civilian 
operations to military ones (Meyer 2006, Giegerich 2006).  
Overall, defense ministries are no closer to a common vision for European defense than they 
were a decade ago. While common principles have been agreed by Brussels-based actors, 
these have not resonated in the capitals, and even less so at the operational level. In a recent 
study, Alessia Biava (2011: 57) concludes that: 
The EU’s emergent strategic culture is … based on the principle of the projection of 
forces within a multilateral framework, which implies constructive cooperation and 
complementarity with International Community efforts and with EU long-term 
approach on the field relying on Communitarian instruments (sic) … It relies on a 
flexible, comprehensive, dynamic, and long-term approach, based on an ad hoc and 
integrated (including civil-military) use of multidimensional instruments, according to 
the circumstances on the field, on the development of local capacities, implying a 
 23 
coherent follow-up of the field intervention. 
However, there is no agreement on the temporality, geographical scope, or operational 
concept. That is, there is no agreement on the things that really matter when launching a 
military operation (Rynning 2011). 
This ambiguity is reflected in the European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003, which is a 
hodgepodge of good intentions, whereby “acting European [is] an end in itself”  (Norheim-
Martinsen 2011: 525; Biscop 2009). While the French support a muscular approach, the 
Germans eschew it. While the Belgians want to paint everything blue, the British fear nothing 
more than a twelve-star flag. And while Italians fear their Mediterranean neighbourhood, the 
Finns are preoccupied with other areas. Moreover, the very meaning of European defense is 
contested. As Jolyon Howorth (2004: 229), using Vivien Schmidt’s (2008) discursive 
institutionalism language, writes:  
In the case of France and Germany, the promotion of [C]SDP fit comfortably both 
with widespread policy preferences among élites and with normative responses on the 
part of the public. In Britain, this was not the case. The policy-makers who launched 
[C]SDP probably saw the potential for discursive compatibility with their European 
opposite numbers. But the government, for reasons of electoral calculation, never saw 
fit to work at that compatibility. A communicative discourse was generated which 
presented [C]SDP as emanating from a two-fold logic: strengthening NATO and 
making the world fit for democracy and human rights. These elements were indeed 
integral to UK thinking, but no attempt was made to explain how they fit with the 
European nature of the project (indeed, this was occasionally denied), or with the 
parallel orientations of the major European partners.  
Institutionalization Grinds to a Halt 
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Despite its early success, the European defense process has now run out of steam (stage IVa). 
The EU has relatively little to show for its defense policy. The UK, but also France and 
Germany, have more troops under NATO than under EU command. In 2009, France rejoined 
the military command of NATO and, in 2010, signed with the UK a Defense Cooperation 
Treaty that does not even mention the EU. While Javier Solana was very active in pushing for 
new CSDP operations during his tenure, his successor, Catherine Ashton, has shown a 
conspicuous lack of interest in the security and defense dimension of her job, despite the fact 
that, formally, she is entrusted with more organizational authority thanks to the Lisbon Treaty. 
There is a perceived sense in the European security field that CSDP has stagnated, if not gone 
backwards.  
One exception, which does not fall under the purview of CSDP, is the defense industrial 
sector, where the EU has adopted a series of initiatives that promise to open up the European 
defense market. The comparison between CSDP and the defense market is instructive. While 
the latter has not received as much media coverage, it benefits from the fact that it can be 
framed as an internal market policy, in which the Commission has treaty-based competences 
(despite Article 296, a security caveat, which has traditionally allowed member states to 
protect national industries). As a result, the Commission has managed to push forward 
legislation within a “defense package,” which includes a directive on intra-Community 
transfers of defense products and a directive on the coordination of procedures for the award 
of certain public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in the 
fields of defense and security (Weiss 2013).  
By contrast, CSDP as such suffers from weak institutionalization (Menon 2009). There are no 
constraining rules, even normative, that appear binding on national security and defense 
actors. As the EDA’s former director, Nick Whitney (2008:10) writes, “The European 
Security and Defense Policy badly needs a shot in the arm.” Its success in the early 2000s was 
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premised on a very active High Representative, Javier Solana, who used the ambiguity of the 
CSDP repertoire of ideas to build a coalition of diverse actors: the Europeanists, who 
applauded the rapid development of a new policy domain; the neutrals, who saw CSDP as a 
way to promote civilian crisis management outside NATO; the French, who saw the EU as a 
way to provide multilateral cover to their activist policy in Africa. When, towards the end of 
the decade, the French rejoined NATO, the British elected a Conservative government, the 
neutrals developed doubts about African adventurism, and the Germans shifted back to their 
reticent attitude, this political coalition lost traction. Today, beyond a small training mission 
in Mali, nobody can tell what CSDP is supposed to be for, and few see it moving forward in 
the absence of stronger institutionalization.  
Summary 
Unlike some elements of EU energy policy, EU defense policy has not substantially shaped 
national defense policies. The irony is that a real social structure has been put in place 
(Howorth 2010, Cross 2010, Mérand et al. 2011). There are hundreds of officials across 
European capitals and in Brussels whose job it is to make CSDP work. This structure exists 
because, in contrast to the EDC, political entrepreneurs with few organizational resources 
were able to play on the heterogeneity of national preferences vis-à-vis defense policy. But, in 
contrast to market and industrial issues, and also in contrast to the EDC, no regulatory powers 
were created. Most member states are fairly disengaged from CSDP discussions and 
contribute little to CSDP operations. There are no constraints pressing member states to 
conform to common set of objectives and no incentives for them to pool resources. The 
adoption of a mutual assistance clause in the Lisbon Treaty is widely seen to be subordinate to 
Article 5 in the NATO treaty, to which it refers (Menon 2009). The very ambiguity of CSDP 
means that each government can pretend that it is doing “European defense” even when their 
initiatives have little to do with a single set of priorities. So launching a modest security sector 
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reform mission in the Congo, deploying a few border officers to the Palestinian territories, 
launching a joint procurement program, or paying young officers to attend an EU seminar at 
the Ecole militaire can all be presented as CSDP-compatible. None of this is to deny that the 
EU is ahead of where it was in the late 1990s. But relative to the hyped-up rhetoric of the 
post-Saint-Malo period, it seems clear that ambiguity has hit the wall.  
Why did the strategy of ambiguity fail after a promising start? While there were very few 
institutional opportunities that political entrepreneurs could exploit in the EU context, NATO 
provided many. In the first years of CSDP, the Council Secretariat was at pains to emphasize 
that they would rely as much as possible on NATO assets, capabilities, and goodwill. This 
reflects the immense organizational advantage enjoyed by the Atlantic Alliance, which 
provides its members with a strong security guarantee, first-rate planning and conduct 
capabilities, and proven interoperability standards. Between the ambiguous project promoted 
by the EU and the clear, US-backed alliance offered by NATO, not a single government, not a 
single military officer hesitated (Menon 2011, Rynning 2011). The EU met little opposition, 
but it also failed to mobilize strong support. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has highlighted what can be called the paradox of constructive ambiguity. While 
ambiguity is everywhere in politics, it is not always used as a strategy by political 
entrepreneurs. On the one hand, a strategy of ambiguity has been shown to be attractive as a 
means to respond to strong demands for European action. Given the heterogeneity of EU 
member states, there may be no alternative when the EU lacks a strong treaty basis, so it is not 
surprising that ambiguity is manipulated during periods of uncertainty, when opposition to 
new projects is likely to be strong. We have argued that this strategy was effective when 
political entrepreneurs (not necessarily the Commission) use it to create a broad coalition 
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behind a project of integration, or at least secure the acquiescence of key actors. This strategy 
can find an echo with different audiences – EU and national, public and private - who are not 
otherwise linked by ideational or institutional structures.  
On the other hand, ambiguity proves to be a poor driver of European integration if political 
entrepreneurs cannot sustain a coalition of actors and fold institutional elements, such as 
formal-legal resources, into their strategic repertoire of ideas. “Strange bedfellows,” to use 
Nicolas Jabko’s expression, are by definition hard to mobilize and keep together. Stanley 
Hoffman believed that the main obstacle to the strategy of ambiguity would be the irruption 
of a “great clarifier” that would eventually break the charm of ambiguity, and thus the 
coalition. In this comparison, we found another important factor at play. If political 
entrepreneurs fail to uncover and exploit institutional opportunities, the conditions that have 
pushed member states to support European integration may dissolve. We showed this to be 
the case with the EU’s energy security ambition, which rests on a weak institutional basis, and 
its defense policy project, which suffers from the abundance of institutional opportunities in a 
rival organization, NATO.  
Nevertheless, constructive ambiguity is an important strategy deployed by national 
governments, supranational bodies, and national or supranational interest groups to support 
for their policy objectives. In this sense, it adds an important ideational-institutional 
mechanism to Jabko’s (2006) “strategic constructivist” framework, specifying the conditions 
under which entrepreneurs are likely to enact strategies of ambiguity and emphasizing the 
importance of institutional opportunity structures in explaining their success or failure. More 
broadly, this underlines the importance of focusing on strategic action and institutional 
opportunity structures when studying the impact of ideas (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  
In terms of the EU’s future, our research shows that the effects of coalition building by 
ambiguity are real but limited. Political entrepreneurs should be wary of taking the path of 
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least “ideational” resistance while neglecting social and institutional elements. As Thomas 
Risse (1996) famously argued, “ideas do not float freely.” Can European integration move 
forward without a strong social basis to carry it? Is it possible for it to do so without the 
presence of constraining formal-legal institutions? As European leaders go from one crisis 
summit to another, answering these questions would give us a better understanding of what 
lies ahead for the EU. 
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